Consumer markets are quickly growing, creating the need to design new sales mechanisms. Here we introduce a new auction model for selling products in real time and without production limitations. Interested buyers continuously offer bids and if the price is "right", the bid is accepted. The model exhibits self-organized criticality; it presents a critical price from which a bid is accepted with probability one, and avalanches of sales above this value are observed. We also discuss how to implement the model and consider the impact of information sharing on total income, as well as the impact of setting a base price.
I. INTRODUCTION
In certain situations, the act of buying and selling may be considered an art. As we will see, special considerations arise in cases where the buyer and seller share no or minimal interaction. In an auction [1] , the "true" value of a product is unknown to the seller, and the sales price is discovered during the course of open competitive bidding. The most well-known auction mechanism is the English auction. In this form of open ascending pricing auction, the auctioneer calls out a low price for a single or multi-item product and raises it until there is only one interested buyer remaining. Traditionally used to sell rare collectibles and antiques, nowadays auctions are widely used with many types of products and services, both in the traditional way (live) and on the Web (e.g. Amazon and eBay). For example, Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo! use auctions for search advertising and Amazon uses an auction mechanism for selling computing time in the Cloud.
Products or services may have a zero or non-zero marginal cost (i.e., the cost of producing a single additional unit is zero). An important part of today's economy is based on doing business with products or goods that have zero or almost zero marginal cost. Examples of these products include adding a student to an online course, selling one more mobile application, adding a Facebook account, offering a new home on Airbnb, responding to a new customer via a virtual agent, having a car in UBER, and, in the future, analyzing a medical image using an algorithm. Establishing the price of these products is not trivial, and perhaps one of the most important tasks is making the product known on the market. Just think of a new useful mobile app: the selling price may be very low or zero but it may be difficult for customers to find it in a "sea of applications".
Here we present an auction model for selling zero or nonzero marginal cost products in an infinite stock system * Electronic address: dfraiman@udesa.edu.ar that involves a certain degree of hurry in making the decision if the bid is accepted.
II. THE MODEL
Let us suppose that the seller sells a product that has no production limitation (i.e., infinity stock). For example, a downloadable software or mobile application. In addition to earning a profit, the company that sells this product is interested in increasing its visibility in the marketplace and earning shares when it faces competitors. Next, let us suppose that each interested buyer can only make one price offer, and that the decision to purchase must be made with some degree of hurry. As an example, imagine a customer who buys a computer without an operating system (OS). This customer is interested in buying the "A" OS so he/she offers a bid price for it. The company that sells the "A" OS must quickly decide if they will sell it at that price or whether the customer will never have access to the "A" OS on that computer. This type of customer appears all the time and the decision must be made almost in real time. Our auction model takes these conditions into account.
Buyers appear at different times, which are described by some general stochastic process (e.g., an inhomogeneous Poisson Process with rate λ(t), or any other). Once a buyer appears, he/she offers a bid price for the product. This value cannot be subsequently modified, and the buyer cannot participate again in the buy-sell process. The buyer does not know the bids made by the previous interested buyers, as occurs in a blind auction. The seller will sell the product to the buyer with the best bid, and the transaction decision must occur almost in real time.
Let us suppose that the selling process starts at time zero and buyers start to appear. The first potential buyer (that appears at some arbitrary time t 1 ) offers a value X 1 for the product; the second potential buyer offers X 2 , and so on. The selling rule is the following: at each bid appearance time, the highest remaining bid is executed, except when the new bid exceeds this value. Whenever this occurs, no transaction occurs and the new bid remains in the bid queue until the time it becomes the highest arXiv:1805.09763v2 [q-fin.TR] 25 May 2018 value. For example, let us suppose that the following bid values were offered in this order: 14$, 15$ 3 , 18$ 1 , 13$, 16$ 2 , 12$, 10$.
In this example, the first transaction occurs when the fourth person (bid) appears. When he/she offers a price of 13$ that is lower than the maximum at that time (18$), the third transaction offering 18$ is executed. The fifth bid value is the greatest value of the pending offers, which is why no transaction is done at that moment. However, this last bid is executed during the next bid appearance time, when a smaller bid value of 12$ is presented. Finally, the bid value of 15$ is executed because it turns out to be the highest offer at the time the last bidder appears. As we saw in this example, only the three largest offers were executed. This sale process continues (up to infinity) because new buyers appear continuously, and the main goal is to understand how much money the company will earn and how many products will be sold during a given period of time. In particular, we are interested in understanding what the stationary regime of this process is.
As in any auction, the interested buyer makes an offer based on his/her valuation of the product (based on the demand for that product). Each bidder makes his/her own valuation and ignores that of the other potential buyers. Each participant offers a price valuation, X, that is well described by a certain probability density function f (x) with cumulative probability F (x). In this sales model, the offered bids represent a sequence of independent random variables X 1 , X 2 , X 3 , . . . , X n , . . . with probability law F . The key is to understand the consequences of the new selling rule described above over this bid sequence.
A simple algorithm for this process is shown below. x=randomF(1); # first price offered y=vector(); # price of sold products x=vector(); # remaining bids
Vectorx contains the remaining bids and vector y contains the purchase prices of the accepted bids. The Total Income earned by the company, T I, is described by,
whereÑ is the random variable number of sales when N interested parties have made offers. Next, we show that at some time long after the start of the auction, let us say when N >> 1 interested buyers have made their bids, an average of (1 − p c )N bidders will have made a purchase,
and each one has paid a value greater than a value x c which verifies
Moreover, the expected total income earned by the company will be
For example, if we suppose that the bid price distribution f (x) is exponential, with a rate of λ, f (x) = λe −λx , then the mean total income is (x c + 1/λ)e −λxc with x c = − 1 λ ln(1 − p c ). It is straightforward to compute the mean T I for other price distributions such as Log-Normal, or heavy tail Power Law with α > 2. The case α > 2 is discussed in the Discussion section.
The behavior described above arises because the auction process leads to a situation where most of the remaining offers become "frozen" and are never executed (because the offered prices are low) and only a very small number of the remaining offers (called "active"), will be executed in the near future. Figure 1 (A) shows 1,000 bids, in the order they appeared, for the sale process with a Log-Normal price distribution. The red filled circles are the accepted bids and the black circles are the remaining ones. Note that there is a sharp cut between the price of accepted versus not accepted bids. The cutoff appears at a critical price x c (represented by a dashed line) that verifies eq. 3. The right price histogram enhances the distribution of accepted versus not accepted bids.
Importantly, after a short period of time, the mean number of active bids does not continue to grow. That is why the probability density function of the remaining or frozen offered prices g(x), in the limit of N going to infinity, converges to
Thus, the complement of the remaining offers, the sales prices, Y , have a probability density function, h(y), described by
The remaining price distribution (g(x)) for the previous example is depicted in Fig. 1 in grey and the distribution of the accepted prices (h(y)) is depicted in red. Note that there is a clear cutoff even for as few as 1,000 bidders. Now that we have calculated the accepted bid distribution, it is straightforward to obtain the mean Total Income per bid in the limit of N going to infinity, lim N →∞ 
where a f is a number that depends on the price distribution (f ). This behavior is good because for large N values, it scales linear with N which is not much variability. a f can be computed in a empirical way. Nevertheless, as we will see a first order approximation can be done for obtaining a quick estimation of a f . The total income is a random sum of independent random variables (eq. 1). Therefore, if we calculate the variance as ifÑ and the Y k sequence were independent (which is not the case) we find that 
Therefore, as a first order approximation the asymptotic T I variance can be calculated (from eq. 7 and 11) once the price distribution is known. The empirical a f for the previous example sale process with a Log-Normal price distribution is 0.093, and the given by eq.11 is equal to 0.102 (see Supp. Fig. 3 ). Figure 1 (B) shows the T I behavior as a function of the number of bidders. The empirical interval T I ± 3 V ar(T I) from 200 simulations is shown in red. More than 99% of the simulations fall within this interval [12] The black line corresponds to the (theoretical) mean value T I given by eq. 5. Equation 8 describes the Total Income per bid for large times (N >> 1) after the start of the sale process. Equation 5, on the other hand, is written for fixed N ; although N must be large, as mentioned earlier, it is interesting to note the extent to which the description is good for small N . A close-up of Fig. 1 for smaller values of N is shown in the inset of Fig. 1 . This graphic highlights the non-linear behavior at the beginning of the sales process, particularly when the number of bidders is less than 50. For N larger than 50, eq. 5 yields a good approximation. The same happens when we compare the empirical T I variance with the theoretical variance, given by eq. 11 (Var (T I) = a f N ). There is some difference between both variances for N < 50, and this difference is negligible for larger N values (see Fig. Supp. 3) .
The model presented here and its asymptotic behavior resembles the Bak-Sneppen model [5] [6] [7] [8] . In this wellknown and elegant model, the number of species N (in our case the number of bidders) is fixed, and the model is studied at the thermodynamic limit (N → ∞); the common limit in statistical physics. In our case, we have a growing model where the number of bidders goes to infinity. But, is this sales model a self-organized criticality model as is the Bak-Sneppen model? Self-organized criticality processes are characterized by stationary regimes that present avalanches. Are there avalanches in the sales model? Avalanches do in fact exist in the model presented here. If one studies the number of consecutive sales, τ , above x c (or the number of sales between two successive purchases below price x c ), a power law behavior is observed (see Fig. 2 ). Above we said that all purchases are above x c , but this is not exactly true. A few purchases are around or slightly below x c . However, the number of these purchases is negligible (when N → ∞), which is why we previously considered them as nonexistent for large N . They are negligible because the mean duration of a sales avalanche, τ , is infinity due to the heavy tail behavior of τ (P (τ > k) ∼ k −0.54 ).
III. MATHEMATICAL DESCRIPTION
Let X 1 , X 2 , X 3 , . . . be the sequence of bid prices in the order they appear. As is true of all auctions, some offers are effective, some will be effective in the future, and others will never be effective. Let Y 1 , Y 2 , Y 3 , . . . be the prices of the effective transactions. This sequence is a subsequence of the X sequence and can be described as follows: Let us define 1. The set of the first k bid prices accepted,
2. The sequence of remaining bids,
3. The maximun remaining bid, , with µ = 0 and σ = 0.3 is shown. The offered prices (bids) are shown for each of 1,000 bidders in the order they appear. The accepted bids are shown with red filled circles, and the remaining bids with black circles. The critical price xc (F (xc) = pc = e −1 and therefore xc ≈ 0.90371) is shown with a dashed line. A histogram of the bid values is shown on the right. (B) An empirical 95% confidence interval is shown for the Total Income (TI) in red. Two-hundred simulations were made and the the interval average ± 3 standard deviation is shown. The theoretical value T I is shown with a black line ( T I = ∞ xc yf (y)dyN = 0.7720651N ). In the inset we show a close-up of the first values together with the theoretical value.
with k n =argmax 1≤j≤hnX j,n−1 h n =min{h > k n−1 + 1 :X max n−1 (h) =X max n−1 (h + 1)}.LetÑ (k) be the number of accepted bids when k bids have been offered. This value evolves in the following way:
withÑ (1) = 0. The critical value can be obtained by taking the following limit lim N →∞ Ñ (N )
and the asymptotic variance can be calculated in a similar way,
An avalanche is a sequence of events where the accepted bid values are greater than x c . It starts at k + 1 if Y k < x c and Y k+1 > x c , and has a duration τ if Y k+2 > x c , Y k+3 > x c ,...,Y k+τ > x c , and Y k+τ +1 ≤ x c . The τ distribution displays an asymptotic behavior (for large s),
with α ≈ 1.5, and therefore τ = ∞.
IV. MODIFICATIONS OF THE MODEL
The model may be modified to have a different critical value and similar dynamics. For example, a bid would be accepted if it is the highest bid compared with those presented before and after it two consecutive. This last model yields a critical value p c ≈ 0.5.
Another modification of the original model may be to use the same rule and add the possibility for bidders to drop out of the auction after a given period of time. This modification makes the model more complex, but it also presents a self-organized criticality behavior. This model exceeds the scope of this paper and will be presented elsewhere.
V. DISCUSSION
Herein we have introduced a novel model for selling zero or non-zero marginal cost products in real time. This model exhibits self-organized criticality [9] . The model can be applied for selling any product that has infinity stock or products that can be produced at the same (or similar) rate of the demand, for example, for selling online publicity, electronic posters, software, etc. In the model for almost all bids, the decision is made quickly and the acceptance price is above a (critical) value x c that only depends on the bid price distribution. Approximately 63.2%, or exactly (1 − e −1 )100%, of the bidders will buy the product (bids accepted). This value may be modified by slightly altering the model, as we have shown. One of the advantages of the model is that the average total income can be estimated with high accuracy.
We believe this model may motivate quantitative researchers to further explore this topic. As a result, new economic models may emerge for situations where there is little or no interaction between the economic agents.
On the following subsection we discuss some considerations for the implementation of the model, and some relevant questions to the field of behavioral economics: what is the impact of information sharing in the model? What is the empirical price distribution? Is it convenient to set a base price?
A. Considerations for the implementation of the model
One important consideration for implementing the model is that each interested buyer must apply to the auction process through a unique bid, as in closed envelope tenders. Therefore, in practice, it is necessary to verify bidder identities, which is not a difficult problem. One might ask, why not sell to everyone who makes an offer (instead of defining an auction mechanism), as the band RadioHead did 10 years ago? The band sold their album In Rainbows using a "pay what you want" method, which proved to be a success. In terms of bids, this means that all the offered prices were accepted. The key point is that under this hypothesis, if we define the sequence of "sure bids", X sure 1 , X sure 2 , X sure 3 , . . . , these bids probably will be very different (f sure (x) = f (x)). It is reasonable to suppose that X sure will be smaller than the value X of the auction model presented here because there is no risk of not obtaining the product (i.e. probably X sure ≤ st X), which is equivalent to saying that its corresponding cumulative distributions will verify F sure (x) ≥ F (x) for all x. Therefore, the total income will most likely be smaller with the "pay what you want" (or donation) option, yet this method has the advantage of socializing the product.
The price distribution
Clearly, the bidder behavior is influenced by his income, the opportunities presented by the economic environment, the valuation of the product, and the auction rule, among other things. That is why bidders presents different bids. If we choose randomly one of the bidders, she/he will make an offer that is describe a random variable X with distribution F (x). The profit depends on this last distribution. We cannot advocate for any one price distribution over another, but suggest that novel products or services would have an exponential or power law distribution, while products that are well-known on the market would have a Normal or Log-Normal distribution. It is interesting to note that if the price distribution has a a power law tail with α < 2 the expected total income is infinity, which means in practice that could be arbitrary large.
Is there a universal price distribution for novel products, for example? In other words, is the law the same for all products except for a scale factor? One way to determine this is to use the model on real sales. Behavioral experiments could help answer this question if the true motivation for obtaining the product is controlled, which is difficult. Finally, an additional thing to consider is the wealth distribution in a given population, which would reflect that population's economic capacity for buying the product. This may "mix" the "true" price distribution of a homogeneous population. Perhaps all of these factors together result in a heavy tail distribution. It would be interesting to conduct studies in different countries (i.e., using different GPS coefficients).
Targeting prices
With additional information about the bidders, one can categorize them according to country, sex, age, and any other relevant sociodemographic variable. Bidders could compete with other bidders from the same economic segment, which would yield more equity opportunities for acquiring the product. The (1 − p c )100% most interested targeted buyers (based on the bids) will obtain the product.
Base price or not?
The same auction procedure may be applied with a base price. In this case, the bids received (X) will be larger than the base price. Companies that sell non-zero products may be tempted to use a base price. Is this a good strategy? Will the profit be larger? This is not an easy question to answer. Once again, this most likely depends on the novelty of the product. However, setting a base price may have a priming effect, a phenomenon well-known to the cognitive neuroscience and behavioral economics communities. In priming [3, 4] , exposure to one stimulus influences a response to a subsequent stimulus without conscious guidance or intention. How much awareness the bidder has regarding the priming effect on his/her bid value is a matter of debate. To further explore this matter, we conducted an experiment using a rudimentary protocol. Eighty-one university students were asked to make a bid for a new product that significantly improves memory. The specific question was: "How much would you pay to use this product for 1 hour a day for 2 years?" All students, except two, showed interest to purchase the product. Details about the product and questionnaire are described in Supp. Mat. Each subject was randomly assigned to one of three groups. In group 1, students make a bid to obtain the service; in group 2, students make a bid with a pre-established cheap base price; and in group 3, students make a bid with a pre-established larger base price. Figure 3 shows a boxplot of the bid prices for each group in log-scale together with the base price (dashed lines). As shown in Fig. 3 , the larger the base price, the higher the bids. Moreover, "no base price" yields similar bids than low base prices. Note that subjects who consider the base price high offer lower bids.
What about information sharing?
Here we discuss and speculate what would happen if the purchase price distribution is known by the new interested buyers. Let us suppose that after some time, when the process has stabilized, the company decides to share the purchase price distribution (i.e., a histogram with all the sales conducted until that moment). Alternatively (and perhaps more realistically), buyers who purchased the product share their purchase price on some webpage or social network that is accessible by new potential buyers. How would this influence the bids of future bidders? We believe this could lead to a surprising effect: a new critical price x new c will appear, which will be larger than the previous one (x c ). This will happen because most of the accepted bids will be greater than x c , and thus a new customer interested in the product will offer a value greater than x c , thus pushing the critical price to a larger value. How sharing information changes the rest of the original price distribution is a mystery. Note that even when x new c is greater than x c and the rate of bidders is equal, the new total income T I new may be smaller or larger than the previous one (T I). The value T I new depends on the details of the new price distribution, F new .
